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MAURICE H. MERRILL'S CONTRIBUTION TO
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
RALPH F. FucHs*
Delight and high admiration characterize the response aroused by a
systematic reading of the works of Maurice H. Merrill on administrative
law-delight in the dominant clarity and vigor of expression of the ma-
terial; admiration of the merit and volume of the author's published con-
tributions in this field. These have emerged during a lifetime devoted to
teaching and public affairs as well as to scholarly work. In legal scholarship
itself, administrative law has been only one of his several major concerns.
His first book, published early in his career, was on implied covenants in
oil and gas leases,' and he has continued to publish in that field; 2 his later,
massive, three-volume work on notice is cross-sectional in relation to the
entire body of law; 3 and he has contributed intermittent articles and book
reviews in the area of constitutional law, together with more occasional
comments on jurisprudence, judicial administration, and topics with which
he has been concerned as a Commissioner on Uniform State Laws. In ad-
ministrative law, in addition to text passages in his casebook on the sub-
ject,4 the stream of articles and reviews has been continuous for 46 years.
Maurice Merrill, as he has stated,' drew major insights and inspiration
during his graduate study at Harvard Law School from Felix Frankfurter's
class discussions in administrative law. Merrill, however, was far from be-
coming any one man's disciple. He studied, as well, the works of Goodnow
and Freund and, later, Stason,0 and derived from them ideas and ap-
proaches that were to emerge in his own teaching and research. His refer-
ences to Roscoe Pound are frequent. In developing his approach to the
* A.B., LL.B. Washington University, St. Louis, Mo.; J.S.D. Yale University. University
Professor Emeritus of Law, Indiana University. Professor, Washington University, 1927-1945.
Member, Attorney General's Committee on Administrative Procedure, 1938-1941.
1 M. ME.IL, THE LAW RELATINO TO COVENANTS IMPLIED IN OIL AND GAS LEASES
(1926). 2d ed. 1940. Lease obligations are, of course, affected by legislation and the regulation
which it establishes, as Merrill brings out.
2 Notably, in addition to articles, M. MERRILL, THE PuBLic's CONCERN WITH TnE FUEL
MR sxAs (1960).
3 M. MERRILL, MERRILL ON NOTICE (1952). Portions of this work dealing most specifically
with administrative agencies are §§ 1117, 1120, and prior sections to which reference is made.
4 M. MERRILL, CASES AND MATERIALS oN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1954).
5 Merrill, Three Possible Approaches to the Study of Administrative Law, 18 IowA L.
REV. 228 (1933).
6 Id.; cf. Merrill's review of Stason's casebook, 32 ILL. L. REV. 641 (1938).
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subject, Merrill saw the legal educator's need to preserve the inspiration
and the enlarged vision that come from jurisprudentially oriented study,
and at the same time to meet the needs of "students of mine-run grade,"
so as to prepare the oncoming members of the bar for tasks generated by
day-to-day human affairs.7 He was to extend this philosophy of service
beyond the law school classroom into work with the organized bar, the
conduct of public interest litigation, and legislative drafting. In Oklahoma
he was, as readers of the Review must know better than I, a principal pro-
ponent and draftsman of the state's Administrative Procedure Act.' As a
long-time member of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws, he contributed to that body's consideration of the Model
State Administrative Procedure Act.9
Two especially significant aspects of Merrill's thought concerning
administrative law should be stressed. These are his "functional approach"
to problem-solving and his related recognition that the value of administra-
tive processes is to be tested by their results in the policies they generate
and the quality of the effectuation of law which they produce. His first
published article inveighed against the conceptualism that denied recogni-
tion as fully judicial in the constitutional sense to court decisions on review
of agency action which, by virtue of statutory or state constitutional pro-
visions, enter into administrative policy-making. 10 He insisted that, rather,
court action remains truly judicial and ought to be recognized as such, so
7 Supra note 5, at 231.
8 75 OKLA. STAT. §§ 301-27 (1971). Merrill prepared, with the aid of his class in admin-
istrative law, the original bill for an Oklahoma administrative procedure act, adapting the
Model State Administrative Procedure Act to the legal system of the state. See Merrill,
Model Administrative Procedure Act with Suggested Modifications for Adoption in Oklahoma,
19 OKLA. B.A.J. 1945 (1948). See also Merrill, Calling Attention to a Proposal for Advance in
State Administrative Procedure, 17 OxI.A. B.A.J. 1757 (1946).
9 Originally adopted in 1946 by the Commissioners, The Model Act was revised in 1961.
Merrill became a member of the Conference in 1944 and was elected to life membership in 1964.
10 Merrill, Does "Legislative Review" by Courts in Appeals from Public Utility Com-
missions Constitute Due Process of Law? 1 IND. L.J. 247 (1926). According to the reasoning
of the Supreme Court in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 211 U.S. 210, 29 S.Ct. 67, 53
L.Ed. 150 (1908), which Merrill criticized, such decisions in utility rate regulation are "legis-
lative" and, even though rendered by a court, are a concluding phase of the administrative
process. That process can be enjoined in a proper case, but only if the possibility of relief by
means of it has been exhausted. Whether such court decisions would be nonjudicial for all
purposes was not decided; but other decisions, which Merrill cites, carried the same logic
further. Merrill, The Administrative Law of Oklahoma, 4 OxIA. L. Rav. 286, 299-303 (1951).
The same opposition to "conceptualism" is evident in Merrill's treatment of issues of consti-
tutional law. See, e.g., The Constitutional Opinions of Mr. Justice Roberts, PA. B.A.Q. No. 21,
147-153 (1934), in which Merrill praised especially the decision in Nebbia v. New York, 291




long as the protections it is supposed to accord to the interests at stake are
actually supplied.'" In his volume of lectures, The Public's Concern with
the Fuel Iflinerals,"2 Merrill traces the consequences of the laws applicable
to the extraction, distribution, and utilization of fuel, with respect to eco-
nomic enterprise, consumer satisfaction, and conservation of natural re-
sources, stressing at one point the importance of establishing "an efficient
and a just administrative process" as a means of improving "the working
of many of the statutes through which the public's concern ...is given
expression." Procedures, in other words, are vital, but are inextricably
intertwined with substantive goals and results. The same thought recurs
in other writings.
3
Given his functional, result-oriented approach to administrative law,
Merrill could place little credence in the "fulminations about 'new despot-
isms' and "wonderlands of bureaucracy' "'i which were prominent in the
responses of lawyers to the growth of administrative agencies and the en-
largement of their powers in the first four decades of the twentieth century.
He paid little heed to them, except to dismiss them from consideration so
11 Merrill argued primarily against constitutional barriers to experimentation by the
states with their procedures, rather than in favor of judicial power to supplant discretionary
agency action by court decision-although he saw certain advantages in such a power under
varying circumstances. See also Merrill, The Administrative Law of Oklahoma, supra, note 10,
at 301-303, and compare his article, Merrill, Recent Efforts to Immunize Commission Orders
Against Judicial Review: a Reply, 16 IowA L. Rxv. 62, 71-73 (1930) (limited judicial review
of rate orders, even as to issues of "constitutional fact," is preferable to full review of the
merits). Later he wrote that the limits of desirable judicial review are generally exceeded when
agency action is modified "upon policy grounds rather than upon principles of law." In the
same essay he attributed the "malign influence" of the Prentis opinion to the view he found
in it, that "a court exercising authority to modify an administrative decision may [for that
reason alone] be acting administratively rather than judicially." Merrill, Oklahoma's New
Administrative Procedure Act, 17 OYLA. L. REv. 1, 50 (1964). I do not so interpret the Prentis
opinion. To me it seems to say, as I understood Merrill to state originally, that a court's au-
thority to replace an agency's order with its own (not merely for legal reasons but as a matter
of judgment in the light of the evidence) rendered its power "legislative." See also Merrill,
The Administrative Law of Oklahoma, supra note 10, at 300. So interpreted, and suitably
restricted as Merrill originally urged, the influence of the Prentis opinion need not have been
harmful. The decision itself, which Merrill did not criticize, seems right.
12 Supra. note 2, at 75.
1 E.g., :errill, Hearing and Believing:What Shall We Tell the Administrative Agencies?
45 Mnmx. L. REv. 525, 526 (1961), predicating views as to admissibility and weighing of evi-
dence on the purpose of "securing all relevant information, with regard to fairness to the
parties and with care to avoid confusion to the agency"--not on preconceptions as to the
merit or lack of merit of the common law rules or on the characteristics of courts rather than
those of speciaized agencies. Variations among agencies will, under sufficiently flexible statu-
tory standards, result from the "experience in evaluation" of proffered or recorded evidence on
the part of administrators possessing "speciality in subject (matter]." Id. at 532.
14 Merrill, Review of M. M. Carrow, The Background of Administrative Law, 1 OKLA.
L. RE V. 225 (1948).
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that he and others might get on with examining the governmental develop-
ments that needed to be understood. 5 By the same token, he found it
unnecessary to assess the validity of a later generalization by a proponent
of agency processes, that regulation was becoming "concerned with man-
agement rather than police of the industries affected," leading to an agency
"mission that goes considerably beyond the notion that... supervision of
the citizen is to be held to a minimum."' 6 Rather than spin theories, he
seemed to think, one should focus on particulars and determine later, if
one could, what generalizations they might justify.
With his basic philosophy and his approach to problem-solving taking
these directions, Merrill started early to develop his teaching of admin-
istrative law and to deal in a scholarly way with some of the topics that
seemed important in that field. Some of these were substantive. In a well-
reasoned article he discussed the test of constitutionality of alternative
standards for maximum public utility rates, set by regulatory agencies.
In a two-installment article he expounded comprehensively the developing
law of a single jurisdiction, governing the recovery of workmen's compen-
sation benefits. 8 He soon added to his work on covenants in oil and gas
leases a continuing series of discussions of the developing conservation and
price-stabilization measures, involving these fuels, administered by regula-
tory agencies.' The organizational and procedural aspects of administrative
regulation in general received early treatment in the article already noted.2"
Later came a more comprehensive discussion of the scope of judicial re-
15 See Merrill's eloquent plea to this effect in an article that demolished an argument
for maximum judicial review of public utility commission rate orders, which was infected
by an alarmist philosophy relating to the "new depotism," Merrill, Recent Efforts to Immunize
Commission Orders Against Judicial Review: a Reply, 16 IowA L. REv. 62, 73-74 (1930). See
also M. MERRILL, CASES AND MATERIALS oN ADINISTRATVE LAW 3 (1954).
16'Merrill, Review of J. M. Landis, The Administrative Process, 17 TEX. L. REv. 243,
244 (1939).
17 Merrill, On the Distinction Between a Nonconflscatory Rate and a Just and Reason-
able Rate, 14 CoRN. L. Q. 447 (1929).
'8 Merrill, Commentary on the Iowa Workmen's Compensation Act, 17 IowA L. REV.
181, 343 (1932), supplemented in Merrill, Fifteen Years More of Workmen's Compensation in
Iowa, 32 IowA L. REv. 1 (1946).
19 Merrill, Stabilization of the Oil Industry and Due Process of Law, 3 S. CAl. L. REv.
396 (1930); Merrill, Implied Covenants, Conservation and Unitization, 2 OLA. L. REv. 469
(1949); Merrill, Compulsory Unitization and Individual Interests: Judicial or Administrative
Jurisdiction, 8 Ox A. L. REv. 389 (1955); Merrill, The Legal Status of a Statutory Oil and
Gas Production Unit, 10 OizA. L. REv. 249 (1957); Merrill, Sinclair-Masterson: A Study in
the Role of Federal Courts in Applying State Law, 14 OKLA. L. REv. 1 (1961) ; Merrill, Com-
pulsory Oil and Gas Unitization: Effect on Overriding Royalty Obligations, 62 MCH. L. REv.
381 (1964).
2 0 Merrill, Does "Legislative Review" by Courts in Appeals fron Public Utility Com-
missions Constitute Due Process of Law? supra note 10.
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view ' and a very superior commentary on the evidence standards appli-
cable to agency proceedings and decisions and to judicial review of fact
determinations.22 More recently have come a discussion of constitutional
standards governing the delegation of broad discretionary authority, which
in my judgment is the best treatment this subject has received,2 and a
detailed exposition of the modern application by appellate courts of general
administrative law standards to local administrative agencies. 24 These
major contributions have accompanied an enhanced concern with such
critical problems in the larger public law field as reapportionment 2 and
betterment of the means for local governmental units to cope with modern
problems. 6
It has, however, been through the study and development of the ad-
ministrative law of Oklahoma that Merrill has made his most distinctive
contribution to that field. The actual impact, bewildering variety, yet inter-
related wholeness of the subject are fully realized only when its ramifica-
tions in the law of a single jurisdiction are fully known, as Merrill knows
the life, the institutions, the constitutions and statutes, the administration,
and the court decisions of Oklahoma. He returned to the state and to the
school from which he had graduated, as professor of law, in 1936. There
was not then an adequate outlet in the state for his scholarly writing.27
With the establishment of the Oklahoma Law Review in 1948, such an
outlet became available, and in its pages appeared many of the articles
which, from that time forth, were to compose a unique scholarly, informed
commentary on important aspects of the state's laws. The portions of it
which seem to the outsider to be most noteworthy in relation to admin-
21 Merrill, Judicial Review of Administrative Proceedings, A Functional Prospectus, 23
NEB. L. REV. 56 (1944).
22 Merrill, Hearing and Believing: What Shall We Tell the Administrative Agencies?
45 M-Nn. L. REv. 525 (1961).
23 Merrill, Standards-A Safeguard for the Exercise of Delegated Power, 47 NFB. L.
REv. 469 (1968). See also M. MERRInL, CASES AND MATERIS ON ADnm sTRATI-E LAW 49-50
(1954).
24 Merrill, The Local Administrative Agencies, 22 VAND. L R v. 775 (1969).
25 Merrill, Blazes for a Trail Through the Thicket of Reapportionment, 16 OKLA. L.
REv. 59 (1963).
26 Norman & Merrill, Urban Renewal in Oklahoma, 14 OKIA. L. REv. 249 (1961);
Merrill, Our Unrealized Resource-Inter-Municipal Cooperation, 23 Okla. L. Rev. 349 (1970).
Merrill, A Proposal for Unified State Constitutional Provisions Respecting Local Government,
2 UgRBA LAvrER 542 (1970). Earlier, Merrill, who taught municipal corporations for many
years, wrote a major article entitled, Sanctions and Fora for Enforcement of Municipal
Ordinances in Oklahoma, 10 OxrA. L. REv. 1 (1957).
27 The Oklahoma Bar Association Journal, an unusually varied and serious state bar
publication, did provide an outlet for occasional short articles dealing with current develop-
ments important to the state.
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istrative law2" are Merrill's discussions of certain distinctive aspects of the
separation of powers and judicial review, stemming from the constitu-
tion;2 9 his analyses of oil and gas regulation; 3" and his contributions to the
evolution and the explanation of the state's comprehensive Administrative
Procedure Act."
Several points in Merrill's comments on the Act may appropriately be
mentioned here. It is surprising and would hardly be known from the Act
without Merrill's exposition that the Act's provisions for adjudication,
applicable to any "individual proceeding" in "any matter other than rule
making," are limited to proceedings in which a hearing is required, because
this is what "matter" means in Oklahoma. 32 In the Act, Merrill prevailed in
his view, which seems essentially sound, that the evidence provision of the
original Model Act, simply permitting the admission and consideration
of "evidence which possesses probative value commonly accepted by rea-
sonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs," is superior to the
internally inconsistent statement of the Revised Model Act.33 The Okla-
homa official notice provision, by its requirement that "all staff memo-
randa" as well as "data" must be disclosed to the parties to a proceeding,
appears to include (with doubtful wisdom) memoranda relating to law or
policy.3 4 Merrill's opposition (quite sensible in itself) to the "rule of neces-
sity," whereby deciding officers who otherwise would be disqualified be-
cause of bias or prejudice may serve when there are no replacements and
participation is essential to a decision, ought, I would suggest, to be
limited to narrower grounds for disqualification than are embraced by
28 Illuminating in itself is a 32-page systematic catalog of additions to the administra-
tive law of the state which were made by a single session of the legislature. Merrill, Summary
of Oklahoma Legislation Relative to Administrative Procedure in the 1955 Session, 9 OKLA.
L. REv. 449 (1956).
29 Merrill, The Basic Doctrine of Oklahoma Public Law, 1 OXIA. L. REV. 262 (1948);
Merrill, The Administrative Law of Oklahoma, 4 0XrA. L. REv. 286 (1951); Merrill, Okla-
homa's New Administrative Procedure Act, 17 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 32 (1964).
30 See supra, note 19.
31 In addition to preparing the initial draft of a bill, which Merrill supplied, supra,'note
8, he served as vice chairman of a bar association committee which, following the veto of a
bill passed by the legislature in 1949, developed a bill which the Association endorsed. 23 OxrA.
B.A.J. 1551, 1553 (1952); 25 OxLA. B.A.J. 1941 (1954). The Act was adopted in 1963, Okla.
Sess. Laws, 1963, ch. 371, 75 O=.A. STAT. §§ 301-27 (1971). Merrill promptly supplied an ex-
tensive commentary on the new law, Oklahoma's New Administrative Procedure Act, 17
OKLA. L. Rav. 1 (1964), which at the outset mentions the previous history and the preparatory
work that was done just prior to the legislative session.
3 2 Merrill, Oklahoma's New Administrative Procedure Act, 17 OKLA. L. REv. 1, 10-11
(1964).
33 Id. at 2 7-28. The same point is covered more fully in Merrill, Hearing and Believing:
What Shall We Tell the Administrative Agencies? supra, note 13, 531-34.
3 4 Merrill, Oklahoma's New Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 32, at 29-30.
1972]
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
his words, "prejudice, partiality, interest, or, in some instances, perhaps,
... conviction." 35 Merrill advocates a sensible interpretation of the Model
Administrative Procedure Act, made explicit in the Oklahoma Act, where-
by fact findings are supported by "substantial competent evidence" if the
supporting evidence was admissible, and therefore "competent," by the
Act's own standards, without reference to the common law.?'
In the context of all of the foregoing aspects of Merrill's thought and
accomplishment in administrative law, it was inevitable that his casebook
on the subject should be a highly personal product, reflecting his convic-
tions and his purposes.37 So it is: centered on state law considerably more
than others in the field, with emphasis on Oklahoma; less inclusive than
some in its reproduction and citation of material; not frugal in its textual
exposition of complex points, but sparing in its exploration of many of the
nuances of federal law on which others have focused. It is well organized,
and highly illuminating at key points in its presentation of historical ma-
terial. 8 Others than Merrill could use it well, although doubtless relatively
few have done so because they could cull more to their own particular
purposes from other collections of material. Merrill himself, naturally,
added enormously to the content of these pages in the teaching of his course.
The book aided materially in educating a bar, which, one feels sure, has
been better equipped than most in the nation to handle knowledgeably,
with awareness of the public interest, the administrative law problems of
a dynamic society.
The values, attitudes, and attributes that characterize the scholar-
teacher's total performance in his field are more influential in shaping the
personal and professional conduct of students than the specific ideas he
expresses. Some of those which reside in Merrill's work in administrative
law need especially to be mentioned. The first is thoroughness and rigorous
accuracy in research and exposition. Probably none of his contemporaries,
unless it be Cooper,39 could match his knowledge of pertinent statutes and
35 Id. at 33-36; see also Merrill, The Local Administrative Agencies, 22 VAN. L. REv.
775, 796-98 (1969), where the grounds envisaged as a basis of disqualification seem somewhat
narrower.
36 Merrill, Oklahoma's New Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 32, at 53-54; see
also Merrill, review of K.C. Davis, Administrative Law Text, 13 OxLA. L. REv. 364 (1960).
3 7 
M. JVERRILL, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1954). For reviews see
Woodruff, 7 OxrA. L. Rv. 478 (1954), Riggs, 27 Rocxy MT. L. Rxv. 127 (1954), and Siegel,
8 J. LEG. ED. 116 (1955).
28 Most of this history relates to modern American development. Somewhat in con-
trast, Geter v. Commission for Tobacco Inspection, 1 Bay 364, reproduced at p. 458 (1794),
packs a great deal of common law philosophy about judicial review of agency action into
three pages.
39See F.E. COOPER, Tax LAWYER AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES (1951), and F.E.
[Vol. 25:490
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decisions of all the states and his grasp of the realities they reflect.40 The
second characteristic to be noted is Merrill's belief in the written law and
in judicially formulated verbal standards as a guide to administration and
to further judicial decisions.4 These directives must not be stultifyingly
rigid or narrow when precision is unwise or unattainable (as a life-long
draftsman Merrill knows when a legal prescription should be firm and
when it must allow room for the exercise of broad discretion); but it is
negation of the law to allow official action to be unconfined.42 Flexible
standards, regardless of how much they can and should be adapted to chang-
ing circumstances,43 are yet essential to the law's rational process in the de-
velopment of policy; for they provide, along with interpretation, a basis of
reasoning, a compass to guide direction, and a check on the legitimacy of
decisions-as do, for example, the grand propositions of the fifth and four-
teenth amendments.44
The third characteristic of Merrill which needs mention is adherence
to his purpose of preserving the benefits of broad vision and of jurispru-
dential learning in the performance of essential daily tasks. However nar-
rowly focused as to subject matter or geography, his writings make frequent
references to historical antecedents, from biblical and classical to English,
and to the work of the Founding Fathers. Comparative data and resort to
analogies characterize all his discussions of state law problems.
When all the foregoing has been said, something yet remains. The
whole person stands forth in a lifetime's teaching and products of re-
search, making the most enduring impact of all on those who feel its in-
fluence. What, then, are the personal qualities that are present here? In-
COOPER, STATE ADmmiISTRATIVE LAW (1965). Merrill has cited the first of these works with
some frequency; the second, of course, is recent.
40 See especially, aside from the casebook, the articles on workmen's compensation,
supra note 18, on standards governing delegation of discretionary authority, supra note 23, and
on the application of administrative law principles to local agencies, supra, note 24.
41 See Merrill's defense of formulated standards to govern delegation of discretionary
authority, supra note 23.
42 On the level of constitutional law, "[tirue liberalism, so long as it puts its trust in
limited government, will be wise to insist that the limitations derive their authority from an
authentic document and not from the institutional theories of the judges." Merrill, Judicial
Supremacy in a Time of Change, 20 IowA L. R v. 594, 605 (1935). See also Merrill, What is
the Best Form of Government for the Happiness of Man, 15 OIrKA. L. Rav. 117, 125-26 (1962).
4 3 Merrill, Blazes for a Trail Through the Thicket of Reapportionment, 16 OKLA. L.
Rav. 59, 61 (1963) ; Merrill, Judicial Supremacy in a Time of Change, supra note 42, at 604;
Merrill, Judicial Review of Administrative Proceedings, a Functional Perspective, 23 NEB.
L. REv. 56, 69 (1944).
44 Merrill, Blazes for a Trail. .. , supra note 43; Merrill, The Constitutional Opinions
of Mr. Justice Roberts, supra note 10.
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tellectual -capacity and productiveness require no further mention. Beyond
them, directing their application and the transmission of their fruits to
others, lie still more important qualities which everyone recognizes when
confronted by them, and which affect even those who may reject specific
teachings. One of these qualities in Merrill is surely loyalty-loyalty to
community and state, to a region, to the nation, and to law as an institution.
Some manifestations of these loyalties are evident from what has been
said; others remain to be mentioned. At this point the remarkable regional
loyalty of the man deserves special attention. In resorting to a figure-of-
speech to characterize the influence of jurisprudence, he likened it to the
feeling one gets when "one looks out over the Great Plains from some peak
of the Rockies. There is the same sense of an illimitable vista, of broadened
perception, of realization of the unity of the domain surveyed, of inspira-
tion and uplift-and there is the same arduous climb before the goal is
reached."4 5 The choice of metaphor was hardly accidental; it may have
been subconscious or deliberate, but it reflected an attachment that went
very deep, as does the love of some people for their cities. It seems a natural
as well as remarkable fact, then, that seemingly all of Merrill's writings,
save a few early ones and some contributions to organizational literature,
have been published west of the Appalachians.
Closely linked to loyalty is acceptance of the condition to which one
has been born or to which one has been transported-not with the effect
of resistance to change but for the purpose of enjoying the heritage which
is part of one's being and of directing it, as a principal resource, to chosen
ends. Such is the nature of Merrill's acceptance of the basic American legal
institutions: for example, judicial determination of the constitutionality of
statutes and of their application, which presents, he once wrote, "a method
of dealing with the vexing problem of adjusting the claims of individual
liberty with the needs of governmental authority which is familiar, in-
digenous, and suited to our needs. We are content therewith."46 Even when
he was most dissatisfied with the Supreme Court's invalidation of regula-
tory statutes, he confidently forecast the adaptations and overrulings that
were to come.47 Whether some of them would have come without the aid of
those, less patient than Merrill, who supported political means of over-
coming the Court, the oracle saith not. The chances are that they would
45 Merrill, Three Possible Approaches to the Study of Administrative Law, supra note
5, at 231.
46 Merrill, Judicial Review of Administrative Proceedings, a Functional Perspective, 23
NEB. L. Rxv. 56, 68 (1944).
4 7 Merrill, The New Judicial Approach to Due Process and Price Fixing, 18 KY. L. REV.
1 (1929). Cf. Merrill, The Constitutional Opinions of Mr. Justice Roberts, supra note 10.
[Vol. 25:490
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have, because of the role of public opinion in the total American scheme, to
which Merrill has pointed. 8
An important characteristic of Merrill's has been his capacity for
strong, forthright utterance, still consistent with freedom from arrogance
or rancor. He could be devastating in a book review, but always in con-
demnation of superficiality, dishonesty, mere cleverness, or pretense, never
of views that were honestly stated and offered on a basis of evidence and
reason. When Merrill has taken a court decision to task, he has done so
respectfully.4 9 Judicial doctrine can be "transcendental nonsense" 50 in his
eyes; but it is the idea, thoughtlessly repeated, not the utterer, that stands
condemned. Objectivity and balance in Merrill's own views have predomi-
nated." They, like his respectfulness in discourse, are linked to tentative-
ness of conclusions, which Merrill has also cultivated. He remarked on one
occasion that he thought it "axiomatic in almost any field of human re-
search.., that all conclusions must be tentative." 52
The quality of respect for persons, even in controversy with them,
stems from a basic regard and concern for one's fellow men, such as Merrill
has manifested in articulating the ultimate relation of law to people. It re-
quired no agonizing appraisal for him to express the conclusion that "[u]lti-
mately we have to say that each man must judge for himself, in the honest
use of what light has been given him, where to draw the line" between
obedience to law and resistance to it. When the individual has acted "ac-
cording to his best light, his conscience must surely be clear in the sight
of God. He may find himself in conflict with the civil authorities, but that
is a risk which he must take." Because, however, human welfare is so largely
dependent on order and on social decisions reached through law, "in most
things, we set ourselves against the common good if we deliberately put
ourselves in opposition to the commands of the social order.""3 The dis-
position to obey the law, including in this country the constitutional deci-
48 Merrill, What is the Best Form of Government for the Happiness of Man, supra note
42, at 125-26.
49 It was indicative of the nature of the man that his first article in what was then his
home state was critical of a decision of the state's highest court. Merrill, Some Observations
Concerning Gordon v. Lowry, 6 NEB. L. BuLL. 410 (1928).
50 Merrill, Oklahoma's New Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 29, at 40.
51 Despite his belief in judicial supremacy, he has been quick to point out to the con-
temnors of bureaucracy, in book reviews and elsewhere, that the courts too have perpetuated
abuses. See, e.g., Merrill, Cases and Materials on Administrative Law, 235-36 (1954); review
of F.E. Cooper, The Lawyer and Administrative Agencies, 42 Mnn. L. Ray. 682 (1958).
5 2 Round Table on Law School Objectives and Methods, 9 AmER. L. ScH. Rav. 566
(1940).
53 Review of T.E. Davitt, The Nature of Law, 5 OxLA. L. Rav. 515 (1952).
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sions of the Supreme Court, "is the keystone of our whole arch of orderly
government."
5 4
Merrill's concern for humankind extends to those throughout the
world whose welfare imposes "[t] he imperative task of our time, . . .to
establish a. legal order among nations. . . ." Administrative agencies will
have their place in such an order, but it is not the professional bias of an
administrative or any other variety of lawyer which motivates this con-
clusion. The call stems, rather, from the intense desire of a total person
to "advance the happiness of mankind." 6 In that intense desire lies, at
bottom, the foundation not only of this paramount proposal, but of all the
undertakings of Maurice H. Merrill, responsible member of the human
race and scholar-teacher in administrative law.
5 4 MerriII, What is the Best Form of Government for the Happiness of Man, supra
note 42, at 126.
55 Id. at 128.
5 6 Id. at 129.
